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In 1993, writer Julian Dibbell chronicled a trip into the virtual world 
called LambdaMOO, where he was witness to what would later be 
called “A Rape in Cyberspace.”1  Into the living room of a virtual 
mansion, where users congregated to chat and mingle, a user named Mr. 
Bungle entered.2  The user, sitting in front of a keyboard, could only see 
text move slowly across the screen as interactions unfolded,3 but each 
user could write what their representation (known to others in the room 
by their screen names) in this virtual house would do and say.4  Mr. 
Bungle entered the room with a subprogram that permitted him to take 
control of the “actions” of the other representations in the room, and 
used this to inflict sexual and violent acts on and with them.5  The result, 
on those in the room typing in their representations’ actions and words 
and watching the others, was emotionally traumatizing.6 
While rape or physical assault in a virtual world will not meet the 
requisite elements for such causes of action in U.S. federal or state 
court, it is not inconceivable that one of the users whose representation 
was sexually assaulted would bring charges against Mr. Bungle’s user 
under a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, or some 
other trauma-based action.7  Assuming this claim were actionable, in 
which court would the plaintiff be able to bring the claim? 
Rape and emotional assault are not the only crimes in a virtual world 
that might be actionable in the non-virtual world.  Contract disputes, 
defamation, and maybe even property rights could all lead to virtual 
world injuries requiring non-virtual world court decisions.8 
When someone signs into a virtual world like Second Life, they enter 
 
             *   Associate Member, 2011–12; Articles Editor, 2012–13 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace, JULIAN DIBBELL (DOT COM), 
http://www.juliandibbell.com/articles/a-rape-in- cyberspace/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See BENJAMIN TYSON DURANSKE, VIRTUAL LAW 180 (2008). 
 8. See generally Susan W. Brenner, Fantasy Crime: The Role of Criminal Law in Virtual 
Worlds, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1 (2008). 
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into a virtual world.9  This world, connected by the internet, does not 
recognize geopolitical boundaries.10  The internet itself breaks these 
boundaries, but in many cases sites are still bound to where their users 
are—by language, time of activity, ISP, or even domain name.11  When 
one goes onto the internet, one directs activities to sites that are 
presumptively directly connected with some geographic place.  
However, entering a virtual world does not create the same presumption, 
especially a virtual world designed to replace one’s real-world existence.  
The result is that every action is directed into the virtual world, but not 
at any forum outside the virtual world.12  There is no expectation of 
being bound by the laws of a given state, except perhaps one’s own;13 if 
there are any laws that the user of a virtual world assumes will bind her, 
it is the specific set of laws found in the virtual world.14 
This Comment proposes an approach to personal jurisdiction in cases 
arising out of virtual world injuries.  In doing so, it proposes that (a)  
virtual worlds are disjointed from the non-virtual world and so require 
discussion beyond application of prior internet personal jurisdiction law, 
such as Zippo,15 (b) this approach to personal jurisdiction for virtual 
worlds should correspond with existing personal jurisdiction law and not 
consider internet exceptionalism as a methodology, (c) in order to 
determine non-virtual world personal jurisdiction for injuries in the 
virtual worlds, the best approach to the separable unity of User/Avatar is 
to analogize it to a sole proprietorship, and (d) the non-exceptionalist 
approach to personal jurisdiction should be augmented by Terms of 
Service (TOS). 
II. THE INTERNET AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 
A. The Internet 
Eric Goldman16 describes the evolution of the law and the internet in 
 
 9. See infra Part II(C). 
 10. Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 165 (1997). 
 11. See, e.g., id. at 167. 
 12. See, e.g., Chris Reed, Why Must You Be Mean to Me?, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV 485, 487–88 
(2010). 
 13. See Chris Reed, The Authority of Law in Cyberspace, 1 (Draft Discussion Oct. 13, 2010), 
available at http://profchrisreed.blogspot.com/2010/10/authority-of-law-in-cyberspace.html. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (proposing a sliding 
scale of interactivity of the website to help determine jurisdiction). For why this test is unsatisfactory, 
see generally Kristin Woeste, General Jurisdiction and the Internet: Sliding Too Far?, 73 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 793 (2004). 
 16. Eric Goldman is the Associate Professor at Santa Clara University School of Law and 
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three phases.17  The first was utopianism, for which Goldman gives as 
an example 47 U.S.C. § 230, which favors online publishers over offline 
publishers in their liability for third party content, even if the content 
published is identical.18 
The second phase was a turnabout into paranoia, in which regulators 
started to fear the internet, and produced stricter rules for internet 
activities than for the offline equivalents.19 
The most recent trend, Goldman states, is specific regulation for the 
internet—or, as he calls it, exceptionalism.  He notes that the 
development of blogs and virtual worlds (including Facebook) have led 
to a sort of specific exceptionalism: not just treating the internet as 
unique in its need for regulation, but even with that, treating certain 
activities on the internet as needing their own specific regulation.20 
His take on this is that in some cases this regulation may be 
necessary, but “before enacting exceptionalist Internet regulation, 
regulators should articulate how the Internet is special or different and 
explain why these differences support exceptionalism.”21 
One of the more salient problems is connected to the source of the 
laws establishing borders.  In addition to newer exceptionalist ideas, 
some propose that cyberspace “needs and can create its own law and 
legal institutions.”22  On the far other end is the argument that 
“[c]yberspace transactions are no different from ‘real-space’ 
transnational transactions . . . .  There is no general normative argument 
that supports the immunization of cyberspace activities from territorial 
regulation.”23 
These extremes indicate the debates being carried out in scholarship.  
In the absence of strict governmental or ISP regulation, does this mean 
that “[b]y venturing into cyberspace, a person steps outside the sphere of 
his home country’s jurisdiction and potentially subjects himself to the 
laws of all the countries in the world”?24  In People v. World Interactive 
 
director of the school’s High Tech Law Institute. ERIC GOLDMAN, 
http://www.ericgoldman.org/biography.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
 17. Eric Goldman, The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism, INFORMIT (July 15, 2012), 
http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1325266. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications and the Evasion of 
Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (citing David R. 
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 
(1996)).  Id. at 16 n.54. 
 23. Id. at n.55 (citing Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and The Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 827 (2001)). 
 24. Chris Reed, The Authority of Law in Cyberspace, 1 (Draft Discussion Oct. 13, 2010), 
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Gaming Corp.,25 the Supreme Court of New York held that internet 
transactions, personal and commercial “shed their novelty for 
jurisdictional purposes [in] that similar to their traditional counterparts, 
they are all executed by and between individuals or corporate entities 
which are subject to a court’s jurisdiction.”26  However, a hypothetical 
Chinese woman doing business through a Hong Kong ISP, selling 
website maintenance from a website setup in South Africa to primarily 
South Americans, could give pains to this 1999 New York case—even 
more so if everything is being done in a virtual world whose servers and 
operators are in California.  And what if there is no “transaction,” but 
simply communication and community, as part of a full projection of an 
alternate self into a virtual world? 
Because the internet, and the perceptions of the internet, have 
changed so much in even a relatively short time, “[i]t is clear that the set 
of legal rules which is applicable to a cyberspace actor was not designed 
as a coherent set of rules.  Rather, it is an emergent phenomenon 
resulting from individual normative directives produced, in the main, at 
the national level.”27  Thus, a cyberspace actor will not enter into 
cyberspace with a transferred system of laws attached to her interactions 
in cyberspace, and any laws she recognizes will be specific to the 
cyberspace environment.28  Chris Reed29 argues that a rule of law should 
apply to cyberspace30 and that the laws should be set up “rationally 
rather than capriciously”31 based upon the idea that cyberspace actors 
will conduct themselves according to a recognized community standard 
(the cyber-community) and will conform accordingly.32  His motivation 
for this is that “[t]he internet has pervaded our lives to such an extent 
that it is fast becoming as important to us as our physical transport 
infrastructure.  Lawless driving reduces the utility of the roads, and for 
the same sorts of reasons we have the right to demand lawful behaviour 
in cyberspace.”33  Recognizing, however, the possible perceived 
disjunction of real and virtual worlds, he encourages states to “offer 
cyberspace actors the same respect that they demand from them” when 
 
available at http://profchrisreed.blogspot.com/2010/10/authority-of-law-in-cyberspace.html. 
 25. 714 N.Y.S.2d 844 (N.Y. 1999). 
 26. Id. at 848–49. 
 27. Reed, supra note 24, at 3. 
 28. Id. at 1. 
 29. Chris Reed is a professor of Electronic Commerce Law in the Centre for Commercial Law 
Studies at Queen Mary University of London.  Id. 
 30. Id. at 15. 
 31. Id. at 7. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 17. 
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creating these laws.34 
All this is to say that, while a set of legal rules applicable to the 
internet, whether the same is applied to the offline world or not, is yet to 
be established—and this is in part because we have not yet figured out 
how we view the internet—what is important is that the rules be 
coherent, only exceptional when necessary and reasonable, and 
generally known and accepted by the online actors. 
B. Virtual Worlds 
Virtual worlds gained prominence in the early twenty-first century 
with the publication of studies of virtual property by Edward 
Castronova.35  In his working paper, “Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand 
Account of Market and Society on the Cyberian Frontier,” Castronova 
wrote, “[a]t a time when many e-commerce concerns are going under, 
revenues from online gaming will grow to over $1.5 billion in 2004.  
Some 60,000 people visit Norrath in any given hour . . . . The exchange 
rate . . . value exceeds that of the Japanese Yen and the Italian Lira.”36  
The virtual world of Norrath37 in the online game Everquest, supported 
by five servers in California, had a GNP per capita that would have 
placed it as the seventy-seventh wealthiest country in the world.38  In 
addition, Castronova reports that “[s]ome 20 percent of Norrath’s 
citizens consider it their place of residence; they just commute to Earth 
and back.  To a large and growing number of people, virtual worlds are 
an important source of material and emotional well-being.”39 
The law’s relationship with virtual worlds is best developed in a 
context that takes into account what happens in the “real reality (not the 
virtual reality) of these games.”40  As Rónán Kennedy writes,41 “[i]t 
would be tempting to write virtual worlds off as a type of game or a 
more sophisticated virtual reality system.  In fact, these games are part 
of everyday life for many people worldwide and will become 
increasingly important as a communications tool and as a method of 
 
 34. Id. at 18. 
 35. Kristina Denapolis, Real Concerns in Virtual Property 4 (July 1, 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154234. 
 36. Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on the 
Cyberian Frontier 3 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 618, Dec. 2001). 
 37. Id.  
 38. Depapolis, supra note 35, at 5. 
 39. Castonova, supra note 36, at 3. 
 40. Rónán Kennedy, Law in Virtual Worlds, 12 No. 10 J. INTERNET L. 3, 1 (2009). 
 41. Rónán Kennedy is the co-ordinator of the L.L.M program in Law, Technology, and 
Governance at NIU Galway. ACADEMIA.EDU, http://nuigalway.academia.edu/RónánKennedy (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
5
Schaengold: Comment--Jurisdiction in Virtual Worlds
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
366 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
commerce.”42  For Kennedy, the virtual worlds are not so much games 
as they are “significant platforms for human activity and business, with 
real money being exchanged for virtual goods and services.”43  But for 
many, virtual worlds are more than just newer economic zones. 
C. Second Life  
Second Life is perhaps the best known of the virtual worlds, boasting 
fifteen million users in 2010,44 and so will be used as the primary 
example in this Comment.  Included among those real-world entities 
with a presence in Second Life are hundreds of higher education 
institutes, the Smithsonian, NASA, the Holocaust Museum, Nike, 
Microsoft, CNN, BBC, and the City of Ontario.45  Classes are 
sometimes held—and created—in Second Life,46 and it has been used as 
a method of therapy for both congenital diseases and victims of abuse.47  
The 2004 and 2008 U.S. presidential elections were felt in Second Life, 
and President Barack Obama has invested millions of U.S. dollars48 in 
green project development in Second Life.49 
The Linden dollar has a variable exchange rate with real-world 
monies, and fluctuates according to market supply and demand.50  
Second Life’s recognition of user ownership of assets51 has led to a real 
market existing in Second Life.  Many Second Life users earn a few 
hundred dollars per month, but some have reported significant success.  
For example, one sale of Second Life real estate purportedly sold for 
fifty thousand U.S. dollars.52  Enough users have created a large enough 
economy that $125 million in transactions was reported for the first 
quarter of 2009.53 
There is no homogenous culture in Second Life; users range from sex 
escort entrepreneurs to humanists to original Second Life users passing 
down knowledge to new arrivals.  There are people who exist in Second 
 
 42. Kennedy, supra note 40, at 1. 
 43. Id. at 2. 
 44. Simon Gottschalk, The Presentation of Avatars in Second Life: Self and Interaction in Social 
Virtual Spaces, 33 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 501, 502 (2010). 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 502–03. 
 47. Id. at 503. 
 48. Obama invested three billion “Linden” dollars.  Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Stephen J. Davidson, An Immersive Perspective on the Second Life Virtual World, 947 
PRACTICING L. INST. 673, 680 (2007). 
 51. SECOND LIFE TERMS OF SERVICE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php at 7.1 (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2012). 
 52. Davidson, supra note 50, at 681. 
 53. Gottschalk, supra note 44, at 503. 
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Life simply to prey on others, some are there to learn as students or 
ethnographic researchers, and some enter as virtual tourists, with either 
Second Life itself, or the sights in Second Life as their destination.54  
There are churches, synagogues, and mosques,55 and a memorial to the 
2007 Virginia Tech shooting.56 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USER AND AVATAR 
A. Being in Second Life and Other Virtual Worlds 
The interactions between users, through their avatars, in Second Life 
and other virtual worlds are unlike any other form of interaction on the 
internet.  It is not communicating through emails or chat programs.  It is 
not fundamentally buying and selling.  Nor is it similar to taking part in 
a large discussion on varied or specific topics, such as on blogs or in 
chat rooms.  The closest analogue to non-virtual life to what people do 
in Second Life is actual living; working, communicating, building 
communities, emotionally bonding, and learning are the beginnings of 
an inexhaustible list of what people do in the non-virtual world, and 
what user/avatars do in the virtual world. 
Second Life alone has spawned a large number of research papers in a 
variety of fields, many looking at the relationship between user and 
avatar, and between the virtual world and non-virtual world.  Some have 
even argued that the end of the non-virtual world is soon to come as the 
avatar and the virtual world become of greater reality to the user in the 
non-virtual world.57  On the other hand, anthropologist Alex Golub 
recognizes that a virtual world cannot be considered equal to the non-
virtual world if for only the different results in the death of the avatar 
and the death of the user.58  So then, how do people cope with this and 
correspondingly prioritize their virtual lives? Golub argues that “[t]he 
hierarchicalization of worlds . . . is here imposed amongst virtual spaces, 
which results in a focus of the true ‘placeness’ of Second Life at the 
expense of other locations where Second Lifers might congregate.”59  
Put simply, in spite of this seemingly mortal flaw, everybody in Second 
 
 54. Davidson, supra note 50, at 682–83. 
 55. Id. at 683. 
 56. Id. at 684. 
 57. Alex Golub, Being in the World (of Warcraft): Raiding, Realism, and Knowledge 
Production in a Massively Multiplayer Online Game, 83 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 17 (2010) (citing 
EDWARD CASTRONOVA, EXODUS TO THE VIRTUAL WORLD: HOW ONLINE FUN IS CHANGING REALITY 
xiv–xv (Palgrave Macmillan 2007). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.  
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Life recognizes that Second Life is a uniquely shared place among all of 
them, and so it is given the most value as a “place,” to the detriment of 
other places, such as the offline world. 
This is perhaps most accurate for those who feel that they are more 
residents of Second Life than of the offline world.  User/avatar 
relationships with virtual worlds run the gamut.  There are those who 
feel as if they live in the virtual world more than the offline world,60 
those who use the virtual world for teaching61 or therapy,62 and those 
whose relationship is bound up in bridging the two worlds—a position 
that implicitly posits a distinct and separable virtual world. 
One distinguishing aspect of Second Life and similar virtual worlds is 
that there are no “established and universal game objectives.”63  The 
users have no mission or goal in Second Life—just creativity and 
interaction.64  As such, the residents “become creators of this world (and 
themselves in it) rather than its subjects.”65 
Thus, it is evident that even when virtual worlds are construed as 
being connected to the real world, as opposed to being separate and 
sovereign kingdoms,66 the interaction in and with the virtual worlds is 
not the same as one has with other websites geared towards basic 
communication, such as  email and chat programs, information wiki’s, 
blogs, .edu’s, personal pages, or with commercialized sites, such as 
Amazon.com, eBay.com, and corporate webpages.  The interaction with 
virtual worlds is closer to mimicking, replacing, or extending real life. 
relationships, personalities, desires (cupidinous and otherwise), 
responsibilities, and cause-and-effect interactions are all developed in 
Second Life.  While Second Life cannot be said to exist independently 
of real life (after all, the servers are in a real-world state, as are the 
people keeping the project going), the claim that virtual worlds exist, 
slightly disjoint and separable from the real world, is colorable. 
B. The Relationship Between Avatar and User 
If we are to accept the concept of a separable virtual world, we must 
 
 60. Castronova, supra note 36, at 3. 
 61. Molly W. Berger, Manon of Second Life: Teaching in the Virtual World, 49 TECH. AND 
CULTURE 430 (2008). 
 62. Giuseppe Riva et al., Interreality in Practice: Bridging Virtual and Real Worlds in the 
Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorders, 13 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 1 (2010). 
 63. Thomas M. Malaby, The Second Life of Institutions: Social Poetics in a Digital State, 83 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 355, 358 (2010). 
 64. Gottschalk, supra note 44, at 504. 
 65. Id.  
 66. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), 
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. 
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define the relationship between the user and the avatar.  This is 
problematic, and many commentators take the approach that the avatar 
is at most property, likely intellectual property.67  This latter 
interpretation gains support from the End-User License Agreement 
(EULA) or TOS of Second Life, which gives the user full intellectual 
property rights over whatever she creates in Second Life.68  While the 
avatar can be modified, it must be noted that it comes into existence 
when the user enters the game, and so cannot be considered at this 
incipient stage to be the intellectual property of the user.  It might be 
argued that Second Life, or another virtual platform, owns the newly-
formed avatar, and in this case one could make a principal–agent 
analogy.  It could also be argued that the avatar and user are separate 
forms of the same entity, one in the virtual world and one in the real 
world.  These two possibilities will be developed below, but first a few 
more possible analogies to the relationship must be discounted. 
If the separability of the virtual and real world is assumed, it cannot 
be argued that the user and avatar are identical.  The interactions the 
avatar has with other avatars in its path through the virtual world and the 
traces it leaves of itself (in communication, construction, and as part of 
the background) in the virtual world are not what the real person leaves 
in either the real world or the virtual world.  Nor can the avatar be the 
façade on communication—a visual pen name—for the same reasons.  
The influence and impact the avatar has in the virtual world is not the 
same as the influence and impact the user has in the real world.  In fact, 
it would be impossible, as the user does not even have access to the 
virtual world except through an avatar. 
If the avatar, as a distinct entity, is owned by the virtual platform 
provider, which gives total control to the user, then it is possible that this 
relationship can be analogized to that of a principal-agent.  The Third 
Restatement of Agency defines agency as “the fiduciary relationship 
that arises when one person (a principal) manifests assent to another 
person (an agent) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and 
subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or 
otherwise consents so to act.”69  It should be noted that this Comment 
does not claim that the relationship is actually that of principal-agent; 
only that the relationship might be considered analogous.  There are 
obvious problems with an exact comparison.  For example, if the 
platform provides an avatar that is considered an agent, what sort of 
relationship is then formed between the platform and the “principal”?  
 
 67. See generally Joshua A. T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV 1047 (2005). 
 68. SECOND LIFE TERMS OF SERVICE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php at 7.1 (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2012). 
 69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY: AGENCY DEFINED § 1.01 (2011). 
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Within the scope of what is expected of the avatar-agent in acting for the 
principal-user (which is effectively everything in the virtual world), the 
agent will act with some sort of authority, be it actual, apparent, or 
implied.  Therefore, the principal user will be liable for actions 
committed by the agent avatar.70  This would result in real-world 
liability for virtual world injuries, and as this Comment has not claimed 
the absolute disjointedness of the two worlds, the relationship might still 
stand.  However, the assent or consent requirement on the part of the 
agent makes this an impractical analogy. 
Another way of viewing the avatar-user relationship is by analogy to 
a sole proprietorship.  The user would be analogous to the person, and 
the avatar to the business.  This is the default, “natural” business form71 
and combines a business and a person into one,72 even if the person 
views the business as separate from herself or her personal identity.  In 
addition, the person retains full liability for injuries caused by the 
business.73  And while, depending if the jurisdiction considers the avatar 
the property of the user, the avatar might be inherited like a sole 
proprietorship, the avatar would likely cease to exist, just like the 
business.74 
The world of commerce can be analogized to the virtual world by 
viewing them both as human-constructed worlds with specific rules, 
boundaries, and assumptions that separate them from the nonbusiness 
virtual world.  The sole proprietorship creates a bridge between the 
business and nonbusiness world, with the business aspect of the sole 
proprietor acting and interacting within the rule set and boundaries of 
the business world, and the nonbusiness aspect inhabiting the 
nonbusiness world.  Similarly, the avatar is the form the user/avatar 
connection uses to act in the virtual world, with its rule set and 
boundaries, and the user is the form that inhabits the non-virtual world.  
While this separation does not take place from a legal standpoint, very 
often for both the business owner and the user the distinction of which 
world they are operating in is evident.  In both cases, the non-
constructed-world inhabitant is liable for the acts and omissions of the 
constructed-world actor.  The two (avatar/user and the business/sole 
proprietor) are fundamentally one, but appear as separate (to themselves 
and to those with whom they interact) in different worlds, for which the 
 
 70. See id. §§ 2.01–03. 
 71. Doing Business in the United States, in DOING BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES § 7.02 
(2010).  This is the default form for one person doing business.  The presumption is that one person or 
real-world entity is related to one avatar. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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avatar and business personnel are specifically designed. 
This relationship serves as a model by which the offline entity is 
subject to any jurisdiction where it would normally be subject, yet still 
retains a presence in the virtual world.  An individual would 
automatically be subject to jurisdiction for virtually-committed acts 
wherever the individual resides, and wherever else the individual is 
subject to personal jurisdiction.  A corporate entity subject to 
jurisdiction in all fifty states would be subject to jurisdiction for 
virtually-committed acts in all fifty states.  Each would also be subject 
to jurisdiction where mandated by the TOS of the virtual world 
provider.75 
IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
A. A Brief History of Personal Jurisdiction 
The United States Supreme Court broke from the historic Pennoyer v. 
Neff76 determination of personal jurisdiction in International Shoe v. 
Washington,77 when it stated that, as a corporate personality was itself a 
fiction, the idea of presence within a forum state for purposes of taxation 
or responding to legal suits must correlate with a certain degree of 
activity engaged in by those acting on the corporation’s behalf within 
the forum state.78  For the purposes of personal jurisdiction, due process 
required that for a defendant to be subject to suit in a forum, she have 
“certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance 
of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’”79 
The Court continued to develop the nuances of this ruling in World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, discussing the tension between the need 
to “remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism embedded 
within the Constitution,”80 and the recognition that “[a]s technological 
progress has increased the flow of commerce between the States, the 
need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar 
increase.”81  The result in this case was that if the contacts with a forum 
are such that a defendant can reasonably anticipate being haled into 
 
 75. See infra Part II(C). 
 76. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
 77. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 78. Id. at 316–17. 
 79. Id. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 80. World-Wide Volkswagen Co. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). 
 81. Id. at 294 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–251 (1958)). 
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court in the forum,82 then the forum state does not go beyond the limits 
of due process in asserting personal jurisdiction.83 
Using World-Wide Volkswagen’s foreseeability approach, the Court 
in Calder v. Jones84 held that a newspaper reporter and his editor, both 
living and primarily conducting business in Florida,85 could be haled 
into court in California.86  The petitioners wrote and published allegedly 
defamatory material about the respondent, who resided in and earned a 
living in California.  The Court noted that the sources for the article 
were from California,87 and the “intentional, and allegedly tortious, 
actions were expressly aimed at California . . . [the defendants] knew 
that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the state in 
which she lives and works and in which the National Enquirer has its 
largest circulation.”88  Therefore, the petitioners could “‘reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there’ to answer for the truth of the 
statements made in their article.”89 
The Court took into account these developments in deciding Burger 
King v. Rudzewicz.90  In this case they looked at whether a contract 
could constitute a sufficient contact for the purposes of due process.91  It 
noted its past history of holding that a contract is “ordinarily but an 
intermediate step serving to tie up prior business negotiations with 
future consequences which themselves are the real object of the business 
transaction.”92  Adding to the minimum contacts analysis from World-
Wide Volkswagen, the Court stated that “‘it is essential in each case that 
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of 
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus 
invoking the benefit and protection of its laws,’”93 and “jurisdiction is 
proper . . . where the contacts proximately result from actions by the 
defendant himself that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum 
State.”94  In addition, the Court laid out a series of factors to determine 
whether jurisdiction did not exceed the limits of fair play and substantial 
justice, looking at: 
 
 82. Id. at 297. 
 83. Id. at 297–98. 
 84. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 85. Id. at 785–86. 
 86. Id. at 788–89. 
 87. Id. at 788. 
 88. Id. 789–90. 
 89. Id. at 790 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Co. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). 
 90. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 91. Id. at 478. 
 92. Id. at 479 (citing Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316–317 (1943)). 
 93. Id. at 475 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)). 
 94. Id. (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)). 
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[T]he burden on the defendant, the forum State’s interest in adjudicating 
the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective 
relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several 
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.95 
Most recently, in the plurality opinion in McIntyre v. Nicastro96 the 
Court shored up the Asahi97 plurality opinion, which iterated that the 
minimum contacts must come “about by an action of the defendant 
purposefully directed toward the forum State.”98  The McIntyre plurality 
rejected the New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding that McIntyre would 
have needed to take some reasonable steps to prevent its products from 
ending up in New Jersey.99  The plurality declared that the stream-of-
commerce metaphor had in some situations been carried away, and that 
generally, the defendant must “purposefully avail itself of the privilege 
of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the 
benefits and protections of its laws” to be under the judiciary’s power, 
excepting some rare situations, such as intentional torts.100  Justice 
Kennedy continued, stating: “This Court’s precedents make clear that it 
is the defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that empower a State’s 
courts to subject him to judgment.”101 
Thus we can see that the overall trend in asserting personal 
jurisdiction over nonresidents has become more refined, requiring 
knowledge of the empowerment of a sovereign state’s courts with 
jurisdiction, in exchange for which the defendant is granted the benefits 
of the laws of that state.  In addition, the determination of whether or not 
the assertion of personal jurisdiction through these minimum contacts 
offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice is done by 
weighing certain factors, as stated in Volkswagon. 
B. Internet Jurisdiction 
If there is one consensus among academic commentators on the state 
of personal jurisdiction and the internet, it is that it is unsatisfactory.  
The exceptionalist debate continues: ought there be a separate set of 
personal specific jurisdictional rules for claims arising out of or within 
 
 95. Id. at 477 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Co. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). 
 96. 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 97. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 98. Id. at 112. 
 99. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2786 (citing Nicastro v. McIntyre, 987 A.2d 575, 579 (N.J. 2011)). 
 100. Id. at 2785 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
 101. Id. at 2789. 
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the internet?  The next subpart will discuss various proposals for the best 
approach to internet-based personal jurisdiction, arguing that the best is 
that which looks for ways to fit the new problem into the older 
framework, without bending or refuting the older rules to fit the new 
problem. 
1. Making the Old Fit the New 
One approach is to distort the spirit of the old rules and require 
internet users to restrict their activities consciously, either in a legal or 
geographic manner.102  As there is technology capable of letting an 
internet user restrict the geographical reach of her actions, the actor 
should be responsible, or be presumptively liable, in every 
jurisdiction.103  For author A. Benjamin Spencer,104 this does away with 
the possible defense of ignorance in directed acts that occur over the 
internet.  He writes, looking at Calder: “[t]he targets of wrongdoing are 
those victimized by it.”105  He continues by explaining that 
“‘[j]urisdiction is about contacts with a forum . . . ’ what should be and 
is relevant under Calder is that the victim was the target of the 
wrongdoing and whether that victim is a resident of the forum 
State . . . . Those who intentionally violate copyrights or defame others 
are not targeting the State of X or the People of the State of X; rather, 
they are targeting their victims.”106  Thus, the defendant will have the 
burden of establishing a lack of intent to interact with anyone in the 
forum state. 
This theory puts a very large burden on the defendant, not just in 
court, but in life.  It also pushes the limits of the substantial justice and 
fair play factors in Burger King.  In addition, it misses the mark on how 
to determine whether the defendant could reasonably anticipate being 
haled into a court, by focusing on the plaintiff and not the state in which 
the injury is felt.  Finally, it takes into account only network-mediated 
contacts.  What happens when the contacts are construed as network-
only, such as between two avatars in a virtual world?  The latter concern 
is hopefully resolved by this Comment, and the former is dealt with by 
other commentators. 
 
 102. A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional Principles to 
Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 71 (2005). 
 103. Id. at 75. 
 104. A. Benjamin Spencer is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Richmond School 
of Law.  He received his J.D. from Harvard Law School in 2001.  Id. at 71 n.*. 
 105. Id. at 102. 
 106. Id. (citing Robert J. Condlin, “Defendant Veto” or “Totality Of The Circumstances”? It's 
Time For The Supreme Court To Straighten Out The Personal Jurisdiction Standard Once Again, 54 
CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 143–44 (2004)). 
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The Ninth Circuit recently held that a single eBay sale did not provide 
the sufficient minimum contact necessary to provide personal 
jurisdiction.107  The court “return[ed] to the original minimum contacts 
test, refus[ed] to use a special test for internet contacts, and avoid[ed] 
ensnarement in the technologically detailed facts . . . .”108  In this case, a 
California resident bought a car from a Wisconsin resident on eBay.  
The car then did not work very well, so he sued in federal district court 
in California.109  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel held that “a contract 
alone was insufficient to create minimum contacts,”110 with one 
concurring judge writing that the “location of the winning bidder was a 
‘fortuity’ beyond [defendant’s] control.”111  Under Spencer’s test, the 
defendant in the Ninth Circuit case above would have had the 
presumptive burden of disproving interactions with California, which a 
sole contact and contract might have given.  To iterate, Spencer’s theory 
not only would have been found errant by the Ninth Circuit, but is also 
biased towards network-mediated contacts.  A more extreme approach, 
briefly discussed below, views these latter contacts as the only type. 
In Michael Traynor112 and Laura Pirri’s113 “Personal Jurisdiction and 
the Internet: Emerging Trends and Future Directions,”114 the authors 
argue that the contention that geographically based personal jurisdiction 
does not work with the borderless internet is spurious, because the 
internet architecture can be rearranged to limit jurisdictional contacts.115  
In addition, they argue that the analogy of a telephone call taking place 
in either the location of the calling or receiving party is appropriate for 
the internet, and that the use of the term “cyberspace” has simply 
created a false idea of a separate space, when everything actually 
happens in real space.116  Furthermore, the authors disagree with 
commentators who state that because one is often unaware of the 
location of internet contacts, it would offend due process to apply 
 
 107. Personal Jurisdiction—Minimum Contacts Analysis—Ninth Circuit Holds That Single Sale 
on eBay Does Not Provide Sufficient Minimum Contacts with Buyer’s State, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1014, 
1014 (2009). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1014–15. 
 110. Id. at 1016. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Michael Traynor was the president of the American Law Institute between the years of 2002 
and 2008. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.bio&bio_id=9 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
 113. Laura Pirri was senior counsel for the Linden Lab and is currently legal counsel for Twitter. 
LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/in/lpirri (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
 114. Michael Traynor & Laura Pirri, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Emerging Trends 
and Future Directions, 712 PRACTICING L. INST. 93 (2002). 
 115. Id. at 121–22. 
 116. Id. at 124. 
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personal jurisdiction based only on that contact, and go so far as to state 
that the Supreme Court, in Burger King, has “retreated substantially 
from a requirement of actual knowledge.”117  Their first argument—in 
favor of restructuring the internet—goes down a similar path as 
Spencer’s.  This road seems likely to lead to a “cat to catch the mouse, 
dog to catch the cat” problem, where restructuring leads to a new 
approach to the internet, which itself needs restructuring to deal with 
more personal jurisdiction issues. 
The analogy to a telephone falls apart, in that telephones at one time 
required one to call and inform the operator which state, city, or country 
one wished to speak to, and then later replaced the operator with area 
and country codes.  This is not a sound analogy.  In addition, there were 
not possibly separable virtual worlds that people chose to inhabit and 
connect with through the telephone system.  To analogize the two is to 
indicate a narrowly biased perception of the internet,  and what it is 
capable of.  Finally, the recent McIntyre decision would seem to indicate 
that actual knowledge is not only not a waning requirement, but rather is 
essential to establishing personal jurisdiction. 
2. Understanding How the New Fits the Old 
C. Douglas Floyd118 and Shima Baradaran-Robison119 provide a more 
helpful framework, basing their approach in a vague enough statement 
about the internet: “The Internet is simply one means of communication, 
albeit one which casts a wider, more anonymous, and less 
geographically predictable sweep than more traditional means.”120  The 
authors start by looking at past precedent as a way of approaching new 
issues, as opposed to using new issues to argue against past precedent.  
Foundationally, they look at the Supreme Court’s decisions in Burger 
King and World-Wide Volkswagen, in which the Court held that the Due 
Process Clause “serves the dual purpose of protecting the defendant 
from inconvenient litigation, and of ensuring that the sovereign authority 
of the states in relation to each other is appropriately confined.”121 
 
 117. Id. at 124–25. 
 118. C. Douglas Floyd was Emeritus Francis R. Kirkham Professor of Law at Brigham Young 
University Law School. PILLSBURY, 
http://www.pillsburylaw.com/index.cfm?pageid=15&itemid=21934 (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
 119. Shima Baradaran-Robison is an associate professor at Brigham Young University Law 
School. LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/pub/shima-baradaran-robison/5/a65/466 (last visited Oct. 
17, 2012). 
 120. C. Douglas Floyd & Shima Baradaran-Robison, Towards a Unified Test of Personal 
Jurisdiction in an Era of Widely Diffused Wrongs: The Relevance of Purpose and Effects, 81 IND. L.J. 
601, 628 (2006). 
 121. Id. 
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With this as background, Floyd and Baradaran-Robison propose a test 
in which “the Court . . . adopt[s] a unified approach to personal 
jurisdiction analysis which turns primarily on whether the defendant 
objectively should be held on notice that his conduct was substantially 
certain to have the impact claimed by the plaintiff to be wrongful in the 
forum state.”122  They argue that while the development of a personal 
jurisdiction test for widespread informational wrongs and intangible 
injuries is not easy, their approach eliminates the issue of intent or 
purpose, and instead focuses on the reasonable expectation of being 
haled into court in a forum state.123 
This approach is not far off of Brian D. Boone’s, in “Bullseye!: Why 
a ‘Targeting’ Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in the E-commerce 
Context Makes Sense Internationally.”124  Boone starts out differently, 
with the presumption that “[t]he Internet is ‘not merely multi-
jurisdictional, it is almost a-jurisdictional.  The hardware and software 
structure of the internet is designed to ignore rather than acknowledge 
geographic location.  For purposes of jurisdiction, there is ‘simply no 
coherent homology between cyberspace and real space.”125  The best 
approach to personal jurisdiction, especially within the context of e-
commerce, is thus a “targeting approach,” which would remove “much 
of the uncertainty that accompanies the usually-applied soft ‘effects’ 
approach.”126  The result, Boone claims, is a return to O’Connor’s 
plurality opinion in Asahi.127  He gives as an example the case of Rio 
Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink,128 a trademark 
infringement case.  The defendant’s Costa Rican passive website 
through which the alleged infringement took place was not sufficient to 
provide jurisdiction; instead, personal jurisdiction was established by the 
defendant’s radio and print advertising in the forum state.129  Boone 
claims that by using the concept of “targeting,” the concepts ‘purposeful 
availment’ and ‘stream of commerce’ are refined in an Internet targeting 
analysis, not redefined.”130 
What is peculiar about Boone’s argument is that his claimed result, a 
 
 122. Id. at 666. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Brian D. Boone, Bullseye!: Why a “Targeting” Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in the E-
Commerce Context Makes Sense Internationally,  20 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 241 (2006). 
 125. Id. at 246 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dan L. Burk, Jurisdiction in a World 
Without Borders, 1 VA. J. L & TECH. 3, 17 (1997)). 
 126. Id. at 266. 
 127. Id.  
 128. 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 129. Boone, supra note 124, at 268 (citing Rio Props. Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 
1020 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 130. Id. at 266. 
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return to O’Connor’s plurality opinion, is what the Supreme Court 
seems to want in McIntyre.  The idea of targeting also encompasses the 
virtues of Floyd and Baradaran-Robison’s proposal, in that the targeting 
seems to not require a purpose or intent to cause harm, but more of an 
intent to connect with a forum state.  It is, in effect, an intent to 
purposely avail oneself of what the forum state has to offer. 
These last two approaches, and particularly the latter, emphasize what 
is missing in the earlier proposals: a connection with the forum.  An 
attempt to gain jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant on the basis of 
wronging an in-state resident, especially in the age of the internet, is too 
attenuated, as the act or omission causing the injury may be completely 
disconnected from the forum state.  The Boone and Floyd/Baradaran-
Robison approaches would seem to be better in terms of following 
precedent and not offending due process or overly burdening the 
defendant. 
What is important is that the approach try to fit the Supreme Court’s 
analysis post-McIntyre, and not the other way around.  A targeting or 
knowledge of directed effects test is the best.  However, the emphasis on 
the act or omission’s connection with the forum state becomes 
problematic when virtual worlds are introduced.  One way of reducing 
this problem is to analogize the avatar/user unity to a relationship.  
However, even when such a relationship is assumed, this model may be 
deficient in providing personal jurisdiction.  One way to mitigate this is 
by use of EULA or TOS agreements. 
C. EULA/TOS Agreements 
In 2007, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied a motion to 
compel arbitration131 because it found that the arbitration clause written 
into the TOS of Second Life was unconscionable, and that “the 
arbitration clause is not designed to provide Second Life participants an 
effective means of resolving disputes with Linden.132  Since then, 
Second Life has changed its TOS,133 and any non-injunctive or equitable 
relief claim for less than ten thousand dollars is subject to binding non-
appearance based arbitration if either party chooses such.134  In addition, 
any non-arbitrated dispute is subject to California law and venue, except 
for suits for equitable or injunctive relief to protect intellectual property, 
which may be filed wherever the owner resides or has its principal place 
 
 131. Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F.Supp.2d 593, 605–14 (E.D. Penn. 2007). 
 132. Id. at 611. 
 133. DURANSKE, supra note 7, at 31. 
 134. SECOND LIFE TERMS OF SERVICE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php at 12.1 (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2012). 
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of business.135 
Generally, the software and certain rights are licensed to the user in 
the EULA/TOS.136  The EULA and TOS are, for the purposes of this 
Comment, effectively the same because for both the user must agree to 
the provider’s demands in order to access and use the system, and both 
give significant decision making power to the provider.137  In addition, 
platform providers often give themselves the power to proscribe certain 
behavior, such as racist or other offensive statements or conduct, 
between or among avatars.138 
The most recent Second Life TOS indicates that Second Life owner 
Linden Labs feels it is legally capable of determining the choice of law 
and venue for some suits against itself, excepting equity and injunctive 
claims.  These are suits against Linden itself, but it could be possible to 
extend this to suits by and against any avatar/user by virtue of the 
claimed injury taking place entirely within the virtual world provided by 
Linden.  This is admittedly a broad proposition, but not unreasonable. 
There exists the concern about extending the scope of these 
agreements to conflicts between private parties, and not to those 
between the virtual world provider and inhabitant.  However, these types 
of agreements already exist and have force behind them.  The Uniform 
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP)139 is put forth by the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Number (ICANN).140  
The UDRP states that anyone who registers a domain name within 
certain top level domains (such as .com, .net, and .org) is bound by the 
Registration Agreement, which sets forth “the terms and conditions in 
connection with a dispute between [the registrant] and any party other 
than [the registrar].”141  For example, Section 4 of the UDRP requires a 
mandatory administration proceeding when one party complains that 
another party is violating her trademark rights.142  Once the mandatory 
administrative proceeding has commenced or concluded, the party or 
 
 135. Id. at 12.2.  Generally EULA/TOS choice of law provisions provide for the law of the state in 
which the server company has its headquarters.  Choice of law is less straightforward, and varies by 
global location of the user.  See generally DURANKSE, supra note 7, at 30–31. 
 136. Allen Chein, A Practical Look at Virtual Property, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1059, 1084 (2006). 
 137. Jennifer Gong, Defining and Addressing Virtual Property in International Treaties, 17 B.U. 
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 101, 113 n.82 (2011). 
 138. DURANSKE, supra note 7, at 129. 
 139. Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), INTERNET 
CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/uniform-
rules.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED 
NAMES AND NUMBERS, http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
 142. Id. at Section 4. 
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parties may submit the dispute to a court.143  Thus, an offline defendant 
would be bound to act in accordance with the TOS, but could, once the 
suit is commenced, challenge the plaintiff’s complaint in another court, 
if that court had proper jurisdiction. 
D. Personal Jurisdiction in Virtual Worlds 
Two presumptions have been made in the discussion of personal 
jurisdiction in virtual worlds.  The first is that the virtual world exists 
distinctly from the real world, and so the borders establishing 
sovereignty within the United States are not etched onto the virtual 
world.  The second is that the user/avatar unity is best analogized to that 
of a sole proprietorship. 
Generally unincorporated associations (including sole 
proprietorships) do not have a state citizenship of their own.144  In 
addition, suing an unincorporated association can be done by the 
recognition of it as a jural entity, by a court, state, or federal statute.145  
A sole proprietorship, in which the business and the person are one, 
would be subject to jurisdiction wherever the person is a citizen, and 
wherever the person does enough business to create minimum contacts. 
Thus, to start out, the user of an avatar would be subject to 
jurisdiction for any actionable virtual world injuries through acts or 
omissions in the state in which she has citizenship.  If user/avatar (U/A 
1), a citizen and resident of Ohio, injures in the virtual world user/avatar 
2 (U/A 2), a citizen and resident of Idaho, U/A 2 should be able to go to 
Ohio and bring a lawsuit against U/A 1.146  That one U/A actionably 
injured by another U/A should be able to bring a suit against that U/A 
should not be denied.  The simplest way to bring a suit would be to go to 
the home state of the injuring U/A.  But if U/A 2 in Idaho wishes to 
make U/A 1 in Ohio leave Ohio and come to Idaho or a more convenient 
state for U/A 2, then personal jurisdiction becomes a problem.  The 
injury took place in the virtual world, which is disjointed from the real 
world and does not reflect state sovereign jurisdictions.  It would be 
unfair to presume that any interaction in a virtual world is subject to 
every jurisdiction.147  It would be equally unfair to shield a U/A from 
 
 143. Id. at Section 4(k).  Of note here is that the policy indicates that the dispute may be submitted 
to a court of “competent jurisdiction.”  Id.  One could argue that analogizing to a system that itself does 
not give jurisdiction detracts from the analysis.  However, the emphasis of the analysis is on the TOS 
that mandate procedures for private party disputes.  
 144. 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 1177 (2011).   
 145. Charles Alan Wright et al., 7 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1861 (3d ed. 2012). 
 146. This is assuming that the identity of the injuring user is discovered by the injured user. In 
some situations this will be easier than others.  See generally DURANSKE, supra note 7, at 165–75. 
 147. Here, only state jurisdiction is discussed.  The international issues of jurisdiction are equally 
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every state jurisdiction but her own.  It is also overly exceptionalist to 
demand a specific virtual jurisdiction because of the unity of the user 
and avatar.  The injuries upon the avatar are assumed to have been in 
one way or another visited upon the user, in addition to having another 
user as original provenance.  Therefore, some sort of fair, real world 
jurisdiction system is required. 
The Supreme Court’s attempt to eliminate the Brennan concurrence148 
in Asahi and focus on directed acts in the recent McIntyre case is a good 
guide.  Simply dropping a product into the stream of commerce, or the 
virtual equivalent of interacting without directed injurious acts, should 
not be sufficient to allow the state in which the accidentally injured 
avatar/user is found.  This seems appropriate, and in conformity with 
Asahi, World-Wide Volkswagen, and McIntyre.  On the other end of the 
spectrum, one U/A directly injuring another U/A, which seemingly 
would fall under the spectrum of Calder, is problematic.  Using the idea 
of directing at or targeting a jurisdiction through directing at or targeting 
an entity within that jurisdiction being sufficient notice to the entity 
doing the targeting, the question is whether the U/A targeting another 
U/A, presumably in another jurisdiction, should be on notice that she is 
subject to jurisdiction in either any state or in a previously specified 
state.  This previously specified state could be incorporated into the 
EULA or TOS, along with choice of forum and arbitration clauses.  Or, 
if it were reasonably facile to determine the jurisdictional state of the 
targeted entity, such as by a simple web finding of identical names and 
products in the real and virtual world, the injuring U/A might be 
considered on notice to be bound by the jurisdiction-granting state of the 
injured U/A. 
Using a predetermined forum (agreed upon in the EULA or TOS) 
would permit any user/avatar to know where she could be haled into 
court, regardless of residence of the alleged victim.  For example, the 
consistent knowing use of the Linden Server, and the continuous contact 
with the server necessary to maintain a Second Life existence, satisfy 
the minimum contacts test in California, if that were the state forum for 
such dispute resolution laid out in the EULA/TOS.  The four factor test 
laid out in Burger King to determine substantial justice and fair play 
would also be taken into account.  The burden on the defendant would 
be lower, based on the defendant’s prior knowledge that she might be 
haled into the predetermined forum, and the convenient and effective 
relief for the plaintiff would be provided by a court system well-versed 
 
problematic, but beyond the scope of this comment. 
 148. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987) (finding that 
“jurisdiction premised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce is consistent with the 
Due Process Clause” and requires no further contacts). 
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in virtual world injuries in a forum the plaintiff knows the defendant 
must accede to.  The resolution of interstate controversies would be 
made more efficient by the prior knowledge of a given state in which the 
controversies would be disputed.  Finally, the substantive social policies 
(read here as policies affecting parts of society) regarding virtual world 
offenses having effect in the non-virtual world of the several states 
would be addressed by the establishment of a defined jurisdiction for 
suits arising out of virtual world injuries. 
V. APPLICATION  
A recent survey of online gamers found that they spent an average of 
over twenty hours a week in the virtual world, and that the experiences 
that most affected them, both positively and negatively, were online.149  
In his article on crime and the online persona, Reed proposes four 
categories of attacks on online persona that would make criminalization 
of the conduct justified: (1) attacks likely to cause distress to the user, 
(2) attacks likely to damage the online reputation of the avatar, (3) 
attacks limiting the connectivity between user and avatar, and (4) attacks 
pushing avatars out of social spaces and limiting their free speech.150  It 
is important to note that none of these encompasses actual physical 
injury to the avatar—because while the virtual world is separable, many 
physical aspects of the real world do not transfer.  However, crimes that 
are physical in nature in the real world would, if committed by one U/A 
against another, can fall into the “causing distress” category.  Rape, 
assault, battery, or theft of what would be considered the avatar’s 
belongings would all lead to distress of the user.  In addition, depending 
on the severity of the distress, the injury might result in a disconnect 
between the user and avatar.  The other two of Reed’s categories go 
more towards defamation and harassment. 
Reed discusses the ability to report to customer service concerns that 
one has in Second Life.  In response to complaints, Second Life makes a 
decision and then can choose to do anything, from taking no action to 
terminating a user’s account.151  The user has agreed to be bound by this 
in the EULA, and in fact could probably not do otherwise.  As Reed puts 
it, “owned online spaces operate very much under a sovereign form of 
governance, in which the owner as world God enforces its will for its 
own ends.  Redress against attacks on an online persona depends 
entirely on whether [it] . . . advances the interests of the world 
 
 149. Chris Reed, Why Must You Be Mean to Me? Crime and the Online Persona, 13 NEW CRIM. 
L. REV. 485, 487 (2010). 
 150. Id. at 493–94. 
 151. Id. at 497. 
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owner.”152  This not only effectively disables the U/A’s access to real 
world justice, but also very much reduces the U/A to a lower-class of 
citizen than the user on her own.  Reed argues for an approach that 
would criminalize certain actions in virtual worlds, with suits brought in 
the real world.153  In addition, his proposal to focus on the behavior and 
not the victim154 could be seen as a first step towards the law truly 
extending its reach into the virtual world. 
A. Rape 
While there has been widespread discussion on whether rape is 
possible in Second Life,155 if it is assumed that it is possible, clearly a 
crime has been committed by one or more U/A’s against another U/A.  
And, while the physical injury that results in the real world is not present 
in the virtual world, the emotional trauma can be.156  Thus, if this 
conduct were criminalized, even under a less severe criminal harassment 
statute instead of a sex crime statute,157 it would still be actionable in the 
real world.  But where could the victim bring suit? 
In this case, the U/A rapist targeting another U/A is probably not 
considering the victim user’s home state.  While the crime is terrible, it 
would not be fair to say that just because the crime is more offensive, 
the standard for determining personal jurisdiction can be lowered.  In 
this case, the two options can be put to use.  In the first, in which the 
U/A attacker knew or should have known that the U/A victim was 
connected to a known state (through the identity of the U/A), the attack 
could be considered as an attack against that state, in so much as the 
laws of that state permitted the victim to self-integrate into the virtual 
world significantly.  In the second, the attacker was specifically taking 
advantage of the virtual aspects of the world, and so should be subject to 
wherever the EULA or TOS specify.  In this way, the victim U/A is not 
without remedy, and the attacker U/A is not unfairly subject to the 
jurisdiction of every state. 
B. Breach of Contract 
In Second Life, one way of developing one’s avatar is by scripting 
 
 152. Id. at 498. 
 153. Id. at 505. 
 154. Id. at 512. 
 155. See, e.g., id. at 504; DURANKSE, supra note 7. 
 156. Susan W. Brenner, Fantasy Crime: The Role of Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds, 11 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 77 (2008). 
 157. Id. at 79. 
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new facial features, body parts, or clothing.  Or, the avatar can pay 
Linden Dollars to another avatar who has already scripted these.  If the 
product turns out to be defective or to not work as promised, might the 
buying avatar sue for breach of contract?  If so, which state’s law 
controls?  Should the seller be liable in every state?  It would seem to 
violate “fair play and substantial justice” to say that someone who 
scripts and sells a few virtual Hawaiian shirts per month has the 
requisite minimum contacts to be under the jurisdiction of every state. 
In addition to establishing the relationship between the user and 
platform provider, many EULA’s and TOS’s also have sections 
governing the relationship between and among user/avatars, prohibiting 
various conduct, such as racially or personally offensive acts, and even 
regulating in-world transfer of property.158  These tend to give the 
platform provider the ability to banish a user, but at its discretion, and 
only if it wishes to.159  The user-avatar seeking to enforce a contract has 
no established remedy or forum to obtain justice. 
Under the directed or intentioned action approach to personal 
jurisdiction, the seller would not be subject to personal jurisdiction in 
the buyer’s state unless the buyer could prove that the seller knew or 
should have known her resident state.  However, the seller would be 
subject to personal jurisdiction in his or her own state of residence, or in 
a previously agreed-upon forum state, such as California.  This state 
would change, dependent on the EULA or TOS of the virtual world. 
C. Defamation 
As virtual worlds develop into non-identical reflections of the non-
virtual world, communities form within them.  It is this notion of 
community that makes defamation injuries likely causes of action in 
virtual worlds.160  If defamation is determined by the context of 
community, the victim’s work and living location, the source of 
publication, and audience of the defamation,161 then virtual world 
defamation will be problematic insofar as determining whether it was 
 
 158. DURANSKE, supra note 7, at 129–30. 
 159. Id. at 130.  Duranske develops the nuance that the provider has the right to banish for 
offensiveness, but not the duty to maintain a world free of offense.  For example, if the offensive user 
provided a not-insignificant portion of the provider’s profits, it might choose to not banish the offensive 
user/avatar. 
 160. This is in the situation where the avatar and user are not so closely linked as to produce the 
assumption that any attack on the avatar is an attack on the user’s real-world identity.  See generally id. 
at 182–85.  In such a situation, it is likely Calder would generally apply, though the issue of where the 
injury was felt would still be problematic. 
 161. See, e.g., Amy Kristin Sanders, Defining Defamation: Community in the Age of the Internet, 
15 COM. L. & POL’Y 231, 257 (2010). 
24
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/10
2012] COMMENT—JURISDICTION IN VIRTUAL WORLDS 385 
the avatar or user who felt the injury, where each “lived” or “worked,” 
and whose reputation was injured.  In the situation of one avatar 
defaming another, allowing a plaintiff to “plead and prove relevant 
community . . . may provide the only real opportunity to recover for 
injury to reputation.”162  Claiming that the injury was felt in the virtual 
world, or even more specifically, the virtual community in which the 
defamed avatar existed, permits a valid defamation claim triable in real 
world courts. 
Because defamation is a directed act, the burden of proving that the 
defamer knew or should have known the resident state of the defamed 
U/A might require fewer contacts, but would still be on the plaintiff.  
Absent this proof, the plaintiff would have the option of finding the 
U/A’s resident state to sue there, or in a previously designated forum 
state. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The development of virtual worlds and the possibility of solely virtual 
world injuries has led to certain concerns, among them acquiring 
personal jurisdiction over the alleged injurer.  As rules on the internet 
tend to be best followed when those who would fall under their scope 
recognize and knowingly accept these rules, determining the rules for 
personal jurisdiction for injuries which occur completely inside the 
virtual world before, and making these rules part of the EULA/ TOS is 
the best way to ensure compliance.  That these rules can fit into our 
already existing rules for personal jurisdiction will ensure that applying 
personal jurisdiction to plaintiffs in virtual world injuries will not 
encroach upon a state’s sovereignty, or defy standards of substantial 
justice and fair play. 
 
 162. Id. at 262–63.  
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